Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 23
Issue 1 Fall 1991

Article 2

1991

The "Whys" and "Whynots" of Judicial Comments
on Evidence in Jury Trials
Allen Hartman Justice
Illinois Appellate Court, First District

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Evidence Commons, and the Judges Commons
Recommended Citation
Allen HartmanJustice, The "Whys" and "Whynots" of Judicial Comments on Evidence in Jury Trials, 23 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 1 (1991).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol23/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law
Journal by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

The "Whys" and "Whynots" of Judicial
Comments on Evidence in Jury Trials*
Justice Allen Hartman**
[T]he jurors are chancellors.
LORD COKE'

Trial by jury [without judicial commentary] is not trial by jury in
any historic sense of the words. It is not the venerated institution
which attracted the praise of Blackstone and of our ancestors,
but something novel, modern, and much 2less to be respected.
JAMES

B.

THAYER

[T]he common people ... should have as complete a control...

in every judgment of a court of judicature [as they have, through
the legislature, in other decisions of government.]
3
JOHN ADAMS

Our interest in the common law of England is guided by neither
pedanticism in the present nor romanticism with the past. Instead,
today we continue to be governed in Illinois by a 19th century statute that compels our attention to English common law. This statute4 provides:

801. Rule of Decision
The common law of England, so far as the same is applicable and
of a general nature, and all statutes or acts of the British parlia*
Based upon lectures by Justice Allen Hartman to the Loyola University Chicago
Law School London Advocacy Seminar in the Middle Temple of the Inns of Court,
London, England, on January 4, 1991.
**
Illinois Appellate Court, First District; Adjunct Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago Law School.
1. ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 133 (1922).
2. JAMES B. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON
LAW 188 n.2 (1898).
3. Comment, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J.

170, 172 (1964) (quoting Diary (Feb. 12, 1771), in 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 253
(1850).
4. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1, para. 801 (1987). This provision was enacted on February
4, 1819, soon after Illinois achieved statehood. However, the common law first came to
Illinois through its adoption while Illinois was a county of the Commonwealth of Virginia, following Colonel George Rogers Clark's successful invasion of this part of the
Louisiana Territory during the Revolutionary War. Later, the common law was again
adopted in 1789 while Illinois was part of the Indiana Territory under the Northwest
Ordinance. See Bulpit v. Matthews, 34 N.E. 525 (Ill. 1893).
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ment made in aid of, and to supply the defects of the common
law, prior to the fourth year of James the First, excepting the
second section of the sixth chapter of 43d Elizabeth, the eighth
chapter of 13th Elizabeth, and ninth chapter of 37th Henry
Eighth, and which are of a general nature and not local to that
kingdom, shall be the rule of decision, and shall be considered as
of full force until repealed by legislative authority.5

The period beginning with 4 James I corresponds to March 24,
1606.6 The Illinois Supreme Court suggests that date was chosen
because it was the "period at which the first territorial government
was established inAmerica, and with it the common law of England as it then existed. From that period [onward] we must look to
American legislation and the reports of American courts for improvements and modifications in the common law." 7
The Illinois courts, however, may not have adhered strictly to
paragraph 801. One interesting deviation in Illinois and most
American state courts from the common law, as it existed prior to
1606, is a procedure still followed by British judges hearing jury
cases: commentaries by judges to juries concerning evidence adduced during the course of trials.
While visiting the Old Bailey8 in August of 1985, the author observed trial proceedings in an armed robbery case. The proceedings went much the way an American lawyer or judge would
expect, but with two notable exceptions. First, there was a high
level of civility and deferential conduct maintained between counsel, and between court and counsel during the trial, unlike the
courtroom scenarios seen occasionally in American state courts.
The second remarkable exception at this trial came near its end.
After both counsel for the crown and for the accused had delivered
their final argument to the jury, the court instructed the jury. In
doing so, the court initially commented upon the evidence for the
benefit of the jury. First, the trial judge summed up all the material evidence that had been received during the course of the trial.
She then further analyzed the evidence that had been given by both
sides, witness by witness, and raised many questions as to each of
them concerning the relevancy of the testimony to the dispositive
5. Although considered antiquated, para. 801 nevertheless continues to be referenced
in modern times. See, e.g., People v. Gersch, 553 N.E.2d 281, 286 (Ill. 1990). Paragraph
801 recently sparked some controversy concerning its application. See Torres v. Walsh,
456 N.E.2d 601, 605, 609 (Ill. 1983).
6. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1, para. 801, historical note (Smith-Hurd 1980).
(3 Scam.) 301, 305 (1841).
7. Penny v. Little, 4 Ill.
8. Central Criminal Court in London, England.
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issues of the case. Finally, she gave the jury the benefit of her
views as to the bias, interest, and truthfulness of each witness, and
the contradictions in their testimony, as she saw those elements
appear during the course of the testimony given. The judge occasionally cautioned the jury that it, in its ultimate role as the fact
finder in the case, was at liberty to come to its own conclusions
with regard to the weight to be given the evidence.
More recently, in January 1991, the author witnessed a rape and
buggery (sodomy) trial in the Old Bailey. At the end of the proceedings, the trial judge substantially followed the same procedure
as the aforementioned judge, but with a degree or two less fervency
and with a somewhat broader suggestion of the independence of
the jury in arriving at its decision. Nevertheless, the two judges'
observations were among the best impeachment and bolstering of
witnesses' testimony that the author has ever observed. In view of
the judges' input, there seemed to be little chance that the juries
would find either of those defendants not guilty-and, as expected,
they did not.
This commentary to a jury upon the evidence is a procedure not
often seen in the American court system as a whole and not seen in
the Illinois state courts in modem times, for reasons that will be
discussed later. In fact, the analyses by the aforementioned English judges, if articulated in Illinois, would have been deemed prejudicial error and would have required reversal and a new trial. 9
These distinctions between the English law and the trial procedure
in most American jurisdictions, resulting in considerable differences in the degree of control over juries that each country's judges
may exercise, are the subjects of this discourse.
The reasons why the English judges were able to share with their
juries, in the detail noted, their commentaries on the evidence produced by the parties,"0 and why this cannot be done in most American state courts, including Illinois, are founded in the long and
rich history of early English court development. Trial procedure
essentially began with the General Eyre, a court staffed by itinerant
justices commissioned by the crown to hear various types of cases
around the country."I From this emerged the first vestiges of a
9. See, e.g., infra notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
10. It may be useful to note that two forms of judicial comment are considered here
as separate and distinct: one simply sums up all the material evidence produced by the
parties; the other not only sums up the evidence, but also comments to the jury upon the
weight of the evidence and its relevance to the issues in the case.
11. For the history of this court and the various courts which emerged therefrom see
1 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1922), and JAMES B.
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jury system. 12 Although the proceedings of other early English
courts, such as the county court,1 3 the hundred court, 14 and the
franchise court i" of the l1th and 12th centuries are also enormously interesting, closer to the present topic is the history of the
petit jury system and the development of that system under the
controls exercised by the crown and its judges.
The earliest jury system seems to have been one identified by the
first law treatise writer, Ranulf De Glanvill, who was the prime
minister and justiciar of Henry II toward the end of the 12th century. Glanvill reported that the mode of judicature during that
period in criminal cases was the inquest system, which was first
introduced in England by the Normans.' 6 Typically, in this system, a royal commission to the sheriff required that he assemble
juries, called "assizes,"' 7 that were taken from among inhabitants
of the neighborhoods where the controversy arose. These assemblies were an exemplification of popular justice, in the nature of a
town meeting of knights and other substantial community members acting as judges. 8 This system possessed a strictly Germanic
flavor. At that time, there was no rational method of adducing
evidence before the court. This jury was expected to arrive at a
verdict not from evidence put before it by witnesses, but from its
own investigation and knowledge of the parties and the disagreement under consideration. Indeed, the jury's qualification to serve
was based substantially upon its knowledge of the controversy at
issue. 19

When members of this ancient jury could not agree on the proposed disposition of the case, they would be "kept without meat,
drink, fire, or candle, unless by permission of the judge, till they are
THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW (1898). The
era covered in these treatises extends from the Norman conquest in 1066 through the
19th century.
12. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 145-56.
13. 1 id. at 187-93.
14. 1 id. at 11-13.
15. 1 id. at 87-94.
16. THAYER, supra note 11, at 41-54, 61-65.
17. EDWARD COKE, COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON § 234 (19th ed. 1853). Assize
is a middle English word roughly meaning "sitting together," but it later came to denote
the things accomplished or enactments passed at a court or assembly. 1 HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 11, at 275-76; THAYER, supra note 11, at 57-58.
18. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 327-28; THAYER, supra note 11, at 62-63.
19. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 327-28; THAYER, supra note 11, at 62-63, 13132, 137.
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unanimously agreed," 2 or new jury members would be summoned
to take their places until they were able to reach a unanimous
agreement, a procedure called an afforced verdict. 2 I This jury,

when considering criminal cases, was also called a grand jury and a
jury of presentment.2 2 This jury was not unlike its modern parallel
in that its function was to determine the presence of probable
cause, rather than to determine guilt or innocence. 23 Its counterpart in civil cases was called the "grand assize."24
The grand assize in civil cases made its appearance through legislation, probably enacted by the council of Windsor at the end of
the 12th century. 25 This assize ordinarily dealt with rights and titles to land.26 Other assizes included the possessory assizes and the
assize utrum, also dealing with land and tenure."
The composition and functions of these early courts began revealing the bases for the requirement that a case be tried in the
locale or venue where it took place. It was more likely that juries
with knowledge of the facts could be secured from the situs of the
controversy than from elsewhere. The word "venue" is derived
from the middle English word "visne," meaning neighborhood
and, to this day, plays an important role in locating the place of a
trial, even in our country.2 s
Trials could be commenced upon the presentment of a complaint witness, who might or might not be placed under oath.29
Under ancient usages and rules, the parties would vie for the right
to go to proof of the charges or of innocence.30 The forms of proof
were many and varied. The judgment rendered by this jury did not
determine who ought to prevail on the merits, but only which form
20. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 375
(21st ed. 1857).
21. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 327-28; THAYER, supra note 11, at 62-63.
22. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 321.
23. 1 id. at 322-23.
24. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 275-76; THAYER, supra note 11, at 57-58.
25. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 327.
26. 1 id. at 275, 327.
27. 1 id. at 327-29. The term "possessory assizes" describes the three possessory assizes of novel disseisin, mort d'ancestor, and darrien presentment. 1 id.
28. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1396 (5th ed. 1979). For example, the Sixth Amendment to our United States Constitution and Article I, § 8 of the Illinois Constitution both
require that trials in criminal cases be conducted in the district or county where the
offense was committed. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8. Our modem
codes of procedure are replete with venue regulations in civil cases, generally requiring
trial at the place of the subject transaction or where one or more of the defendants reside.
See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-101 (1989).
29. THAYER, supra note 11, at 12.
30. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 301; THAYER, supra note 11, at 10.
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of trial was to be utilized.3a One complaint witness was often
enough to start the procedure.3 2 Parenthetically, such a witness
could be challenged to a duel himself.33 If there was more than one
complaint witness, and if a defendant could get such witnesses to
disagree among themselves, he might win the case without need for
a trial. 34 The complaint witnesses were called the secta35 and were

sometimes confused in historical accounts with the proof witnesses.
In actuality, however, the advent of proof witnesses came later.36
In the centuries following the Norman Conquest, the trials as
ordered by these juries took various forms, including trials by the
one-sided witnesses or secta, by oath or compurgation, by ordeal,
or by battle.37 It should be noted that the word "trial," in those
early times, was not the word used to describe the proceedings.
Instead, the words used were "probatio," or direct proof, such as
that by showing a bodily wound; "purgatio," made by oath-taking
which was often required to be supported by twelve compurgators,
neighbors, or relatives who swore that they believed the oath-taker;
"ordalie," subjection of a defendant to ordeal by fire or water, expecting divine intervention to demonstrate truth or falsity by virtue
of the defendant's survival or demise, in other words, an appeal to
heaven; and, "duellum," or battle, in which the contending parties
fought a duel, either in person or by a substitute, with the winner
designated the champion.38
All such modes of early dispute resolution fell into disuse and
eventually gave way to the gentler, more civilized trial. This latter
procedure was established only through the intervention of royal
power.
Unfortunately, public records of this transition in trial
methods are sparse and incomplete. Record keeping was confined
largely to entries in the Domesday Book, ordered by William the
Conqueror to record social and economic conditions in 1085. Entries essentially noted local customs; descriptions, possession, and
tenure of land; taxability of landowners; status of individuals; and
disputes and identities of parties to litigation.' The information
31. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11,
32. THAYER, supra note 11, at 12.
33. Id.
34. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11,
35. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11,
36. THAYER, supra note 11, at 12.
37. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11,
38. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11,
39. THAYER, supra note 11, at 49.
40. Id. at 51.

at 301; THAYER, supra note 11, at 10.
at 300-01; THAYER, supra note 11, at 12.
at 300; THAYER, supra note 11, at 10.
at 300; THAYER, supra note 11, at 16.
at 299-312; THAYER, supra note 11, at 16 n.1.
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was compiled, in part, from jury verdicts.41
It appears that the transition from the original Frankish and
Norman inquisition system to what became the more English-oriented trial was slow. Trial procedure before the court, commissioned by the crown, was called the inquiry.42 The answer to be
given by the court was called the recognition.43 A Variety of assizes
gradually developed, delineated according to the subject matter of
the inquiry, and were classified as petit assizes and great assizes.
These assizes also were commenced by obtaining royal writs,
which directed that inquests be sworn to answer the questions
specified by the writs. 44 Through this system there developed a
more rational method of deciding questions of fact identified and
referred to by the assizes. 45 Those questions were then to be decided at trial by a body of men early referred to as a common law
jurata, or what we now call a jury. 46
The utilization of trials by jury, first obtainable only through the
royal writ, began to expand in breadth and increase in number
with the development of new writs and forms of action that provided the aggrieved parties with potential remedies.47 The writs
subsequently became available as of right, particularly through article 36 of the Magna Carta.48 Chancery clerks began issuing writs
in actions on the case and in trespass, and, still later, in other actions of course. 49 Litigation following this mode burgeoned in the
13th and 14th centuries. By the middle of the 15th century, statutes had to be enacted to relieve certain abuses in-the now flourishing varieties of jury trials.50
The records of early criminal trials reveal the commissions of the
judges, the presentments of the grand juries, the indictments, the
defendants' pleas, the placements by defendants for trials "upon
the country," and the summons of the juries and their verdicts.5
Apparently, however, during this period, little notice was taken of
either the evidence received or the directions given by the judges to
the juries, with which we are concerned. The early juries, as noted
41.
42.

1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 313.
1 id. at 330.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

THAYER, supra note 11, at 55.
Id. at 58-59.
Id. at 57-58.
1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 330-32; THAYER, supra note 11, at 65, 146- 47.
THAYER, supra note 11, at 66-67.
Id. at 68.
Id. at 66-67.
Id. at 67-68.
Id.
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previously, were themselves the witnesses and represented the evidence or proof.5 2 Not all accused criminal defendants, however,
enjoyed even this rudimentary form of trial. According to the formalism then so popular in the courts, the consent of the accused to
a trial by jury and his plea to the charges were both required in
order to bring the accused to trial." The accused did not always
cooperate and sometimes was coerced by torture and starvation
until he gave his consent, or died in the process.54
When jury trials were fully utilized, such evidence as the jury
held by virtue of their private knowledge of the facts, gave them as
much right to rely upon these subjective facts as any evidence
given in court." It also was held that although no proof had been
presented by either side, the jury might bring in a verdict anyway
based largely upon their own personal knowledge.56
Later, in the 13th and 14th centuries, another form of jury coercion and control came into play when the heavy burden of attaints
was extended to trial by jury. A jury was made subject to the penalties of attaint for rendering false verdicts.57 For example, a verdict would be considered false when sworn grand jury members,
who found probable cause, later sitting as petit jury members at
trial, acquitted the defendant. 58 The penalties for false verdicts included forfeiture of the jury's goods and profits; loss of their
homes, forests, and meadows; and the removal of their wives and
children from their domiciles.5 9
This primitive method of jury control continued until 1670
when, in Bushell's Case, the jury that acquitted Quakers William
Penn and William Mead of the charge of unlawful assembly were
themselves absolved and discharged without punishment.' James
B. Thayer, a noted scholar on evidence at the common law, attaches importance to Bushell's Case due to its stance regarding jury
control. Thayer observed that Lord Chief Justice John Vaughan's
opinion in Bushell emphasized two things: first, that the jury is the
judge of the evidence; and second, that because the jury may have
acted upon evidence of which the judge had no knowledge, it
52.

See supra notes 19, 29 and accompanying text.

53.
54.
55.

1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 326; THAYER, supra note 11, at 68-69.
1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 326; THAYER, supra note 11, at 68-69.
3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at 374.

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

3 id.
1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 341; THAYER, supra note 11, at 137.
See 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 343.
3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at 404; 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 341.
THAYER, supra note 11, at 166-67.
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would be absurd for the judge to punish that jury for deciding a
case contrary to the judge's own conclusions. 6 Accordingly,
Bushell's Case appears to mark the increasing awareness of the judiciary with respect to jury control and its parameters.
Until Bushell's Case, however, a jury was sometimes permitted
to escape the heavy penalties of attaint only by providing proof
that existed outside of their personal knowledge.62 Still later, when
it became known that a juror had any personal knowledge of any
matter in issue, the juror was required to be sworn as a witness and
to give his evidence in court.63
Similarly, because the crown in the early days had a continuing
interest in securing convictions, particularly of those persons indicted for the commission of treason or other serious crimes, the
crown demanded and encouraged the presence of the indictors on
the petit or trial jury as well. 64 During the reign of Henry III,
"mixed" juries, composed of both witnesses and judges of the effect
of testimony, often sat together asjurataper patriam et per testes.65
By the 14th century, however, the practice of allowing the indictors also to sit upon the trial jury was discouraged. 66 In addition, the civil petit jury thereafter started to become a separate
body for purposes of trial and was drawn from the country at
large. 67 The need for neighbors or hundredors in criminal juries,
however, was not formally abolished until the 19th century.68
Nevertheless, juries in both civil and criminal cases gradually
ceased being witnesses and eventually became what we recognize
today as judges of the facts.69
With the increasing utilization of independent sources of evidence in old England came two other profound modifications of
the medieval jury trial system. Pleading and practice rules developed, and a body of evidentiary rules was created. 70 These new
developments led to the establishment of rules requiring pleadings
in order to place the controversy between the parties at issue. Correspondingly, with the identification of the issues came the need for
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 167-69.
Id.
1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note ii, at 336.
1 id. at 346.

65.

THOMAS STARKIE, PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 8 (10th

ed. 1876).
66. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11,
67. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11,
68. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11,
69. 1 id. at 334-36.
70. See 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note

at 336-37; THAYER, supra note 11, at 93-94.
at 336-37; THAYER, supra note 11, at 93-94.
at 332.

11, at 627-58; THAYER, supra note 11, at 114-20.
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rules administering the proofs, or evidence, to be submitted by the
parties in support of their pleading for consideration by the fact
finder. Governance over pleadings and rules of evidence also added new elements of control by judges over juries.
The requirement of pleadings in litigation also did much to centralize the system of the common law, whereas other systems of
law continued to permit generalization of the issues.71 The English
rules tended to extract with greater precision the questions to be
resolved by identifying both points upon which the parties agreed
and in what instances proof to support controverted allegations
was required.72 Concomitantly, this sifting procedure matured
into an elaboration of differences between questions of law for the
court and questions of fact for the jury. 73 The rules continually
became more sophisticated, enabling the parties and the court to
achieve greater and more varied dispositions of pending
litigation.74
What started as a system of oral pleading began to give way to
written pleadings.75 Unfortunately, with the advent of written
pleadings came the rigid formalism attending the forms of action
that became so notorious after the 15th century.76 Oral pleadings
were put into writing by prothonotaries, who entered upon a
parchment roll the pleas, proceedings, and judgment, which was
then filed in the treasury of the court.77 Eventually, the pleadings
were drafted by the attorneys themselves or by counsel hired solely
for that purpose, because they were possessed of special knowledge, experience, and skill in what became a very complicated process. 78 Pleaders of the causes in court became the latter-day
barristers, and those acting as agents of suitors presaged the role of
solicitors.
Methods of providing evidence for consideration by juries also
had been evolving throughout this era. The need for a judge to
know as much about the case before him as the jurors did required
the introduction in court of dispositive evidence through witnesses
who were totally independent of the decision-making process.79
71.

3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 627-28.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

3 id.
3 id. at 628.
See 3 id. at 627-58.
3 id. at 639-40.
See 3 id. at 641-48, 650-51.
3 id. at 642-44.
3 id. at 639-48.

79.

9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 127-33.
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Having such witnesses available to testify was considerably difficult. Early on, volunteer witnesses were looked upon with suspicion because they often offered false testimony for which they
became subject to punishment for maintenance.80 Volunteer witnesses later were encouraged to come forward, especially when testifying on behalf of the crown."' The practice of bringing in
witnesses by compulsion, through the process of subpoena,
evolved. 2 Mixed signals were sometimes given, however, and until
the end of the 17th century, independent witnesses often could not
be sworn if their testimony favored the defense in a criminal case. 3
These earlier, crude methods of jury control by the judiciary
eventually gave way to more sophisticated means of achieving the
desired results. Governance over pleadings was one way to limit
jury questions.8 4 Careful choice of juries by the crown was another
way. 5 Rulings upon the admissibility of evidence were a further
judicial exercise of control over juries.8 6 The recognition of presumptions of fact by the court also diminished the totality of jury
decisions by eliminating certain questions from consideration. 7
Objections and exceptions to evidence offered by the parties additionally limited jury assignments.8 8 Special verdicts came into use,
limiting the jury's power to make overall decisions in cases,8 9 and
verdicts directed by the judges disposed of unwanted jury decisions. 9° The granting of new trials also became a means of diminishing jury influence in the decision-making process. 91
The questions of the respective duties and responsibilities of
judges and juries eventually became a matter of legislative concern
in the English realm. For example, in 1641, the Irish parliament
propounded a question to the judges of that country, asking
"whether the judge or jurors ought to be judge of the matter of
fact."92 The judges replied, "the jurors [are] the sole judges of matter of fact, yet the judges of the court are judges of the validity of
80. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 334-35.
81. 1 id. at 335-36.
82. 1 id. at 335.
83. 1 id. at 335-37.
84. See 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 633-34.
85. See 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 346.
86. See THAYER, supra note 11, at 180-8 1.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 187-88.
90. See id. at 180.
91. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 346- 47.
92. 1 PITT TAYLOR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 23, n.1 (8th ed.
1887) (citing 2 NALSON'S COLLECTION OF STATE PAPERS 575, 582 (1683)).
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the evidence and of the matters of law arising
out of the same,
'93
wherein the jury ought to be guided by them.
By the 17th century, the courts' close guidance of juries developed into what is now modem practice in England. After a court
received all the evidence produced by both sides and counsel had
delivered argument to the jury, it became the practice for the judge
to sum up the whole of the evidence to the jury while the parties
and counsel were present. The judge typically omitted all superfluous circumstances, identified the principal issue, stated what evidence had been given in support, and made such remarks as the
judge thought necessary for the direction of the jury.94
What was the perceived need for this then relatively new procedure? The answer, in large part, is found in Burke's report on the
Warren Hastings trial:
In the trials below, the Judges decide on the competency of the
evidence before it goes to the jury, and ... with great propriety
and wisdom. Juries are taken promiscuously from the mass of
the people; they are composed of men who in many instances, in
most perhaps, were never concerned in any causes, judicially or
otherwise, before the time of their service. They have generally
no previous preparation or possible knowledge of the matter to
be tried; and they decide in a space of time too short for any nice
or critical disposition. These Judges, therefore, of necessity must
forestall the evidence where there is a doubt on its competence,
and indeed observe much on its credibility, or the most dreadful
consequences might follow. The institution of juries, if not thus
qualified, could not exist. 95
Thayer agrees that English judges should comment on the evidence for the jury's benefit. Without such commentary, Thayer
argues that "[t]rial by jury, in such a form as that, is not trial by
jury in any historic sense of the words. It is not the venerated
institution which attracted the praise of Blackstone and of our ancestors, but96 something novel, modem, and much less to be
respected.
Another commentator, Thomas Starkie, has stated that "it must
be admitted to be essential that [the jury's] attention should be
skillfully directed to the points material for their consideration." 97
93.
94.
95.

1 id.
3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at 374.
9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2551 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1981) (citing
31 PARL. HIST. ENG. 357 (1794) (Report to the House of Commons)).
96. THAYER, supra note 11, at 188 n.2.
97. STARKIE, supra note 65, at 810.
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Otherwise, "the full benefit to be
derived from the united discern98
ment of a jury" would be lost.

The struggle over the appropriate responsibilities of juries and
judges continued over the centuries. Lord Mansfield observed that
the fundamental definition of trial by jury depended upon the universal principle, "ad quaestionemjuris non respondentjuratores;ad
quaestionemfacti non respondentjudices."99 Freely translated, this
meant that whether there is any reasonable evidence is a question
for the judge; but whether the evidence is satisfactory is a question
for the jury. Lord Mansfield went on to say:
The constitution trusts that, under the direction of a judge, [the
jurors] will not usurp a jurisdiction which is not in their province. They do not know, and are not presumed to know, the law:
they are not sworn to decide the law; they are not required to
decide the law ....

It is the duty of the judge, in all cases of

general justice, to tell the jury how to do right, though they have
it in theirpower to do wrong, which is a matter entirely between
God and their own consciences.'°°
The observation has been made, however, that problems persisted when judges exercised their rights to make observations
upon the facts and give instructions to the jury on the law of the
case.101 In particular, many judges, including those of great ability,
did not confine their observations to summing up and commenting
on the weight of the evidence, but instead gave "their opinions respecting the matters of fact; and although this mode of proceeding,
when adopted, as it sometimes has been, in a supercilious spirit,
may arouse the jealous feelings of a jury, and may excite them, in
their anxiety to prove their independence, to pronounce an unjust
verdict."102 To avoid such a result, the following advice was given
by Lord Bacon to one Judge Hutton, which was, "you should be a
light to jurors to open their eyes, but not a guide to lead them by
their noses."103
As time went on, the practice of judges commenting on the evidence met further resistance because the Stuart judges exceeded
98. Id.
99. 1 TAYLOR, supra note 92, § 22 n. 10 (citing Regina v. The Dean of Saint Asaph,
100 Eng. Rep. 657 (K.B. 1784)). An earlier version is set forth in COKE, supra note 17,
§ 234.
100. 1 TAYLOR, supra note 92, § 22 n. 10 (citing Regina v. The Dean of Saint Asaph,
100 Eng. Rep. 657 (K.B. 1784)).
101. 1 TAYLOR, supra note 92, § 25.
102. 1 id.
103. 1 id. § 25 n.I (quoting VII BAC. WORKS 271 (Montague ed.)).
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"the bounds of decency" while attempting to coerce juries."° The
tide of popular resentment ran strong against the judges.0 " The
jury was popularly regarded as a protection against the despotic
power of the crown, and writers claimed that even wider powers
belonged to the jury, which included being judges not only of the
facts but also of the law."° Although the judges might advise the
jurors as to the law, the jurors retained the right and power to
determine for themselves whether the judge's view of the law was
correct.'
During the treason trial of Colonel John Lilburne in
1649, the defendant reportedly proclaimed to the court: "The jury
by law are not only judges of fact but of law also, and you who call
yourselves judges of the law are no more but Norman intruders,
and indeed and in truth, if the jury please, are no more but cyphers
to pronounce their verdict."'0 8
Important changes took place after the bloodless English revolution of 1688. The direct power of the crown over judges ceased
when the Act of Settlement in 1700109 provided that judges no
longer held office at the pleasure of the crown but, upon good be0 Thereafter, in Britain, the confidence of the peohavior, for life. 11
ple in the judges underwent restoration,' 11 and with it came a
corresponding diminution in prevailing approbation of wide jury
powers." 2 By the time of the American Revolution in 1776, the
principle was well established in English law that juries would be
limited to answering questions of fact and judges limited to questions of law. " 3 British judges again resumed commenting to juries
upon the evidence, as before, and as at present.
Why wasn't this practice carried over to America as part of the
general common law assimilation?' First, it is not entirely clear
104.

Austin Wakeman Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure, 31

HARV. L. REV. 669, 676 (1918).

105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id.
Id.
108. Id. at 676 (quoting VARAX, TRIAL OF COLONEL LILBURNE 107 (2d ed.)).
109. Scott, supra note 104, at 677 (citing 12 & 13 WILL. III ch.2).
110. Id.
111.

Id.

112. Id.
113. Id.
114. It is maintained that:
What the statute adopted was not just those precedents which happened to have
already been announced by English courts at the close of the sixteenth century,
but rather a system of law whose outstanding characteristic is its adaptability
and capacity for growth. The common law which the statute adopted "is a
system of elementary rules and of general judicial declarations of principles,
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whether the practice of judicial commentary described by Blackstone as having developed in the 17th century was the established
practice at all," 5 and if so, whether the practice was established
before 1606, when 4 James I existed. Perhaps more important, in
America before the American Revolution, British colonial judges
continued to serve by appointment of the King." 16 Frequently,
these colonial judges had little or no legal training and were ordinary laymen."" As expected, they favored the crown in whatever
controversy came before them."8 The jury was perceived by colonists as an important democratic body because it was composed of
twelve laymen to decide a case instead of one layman who posed as
a judge." 9 In 1735, in fact, after a jury refused to submit to the
instruction of the court in the trial of John Peter Zenger, the jury
system became even more popularly regarded in the colonies, especially in the Jeffersonian period, and later in the Jacksonian period. 2 ° More than an element in the administration of justice, the
American jury became a political symbol of democracy. Alexis de
Tocqueville observed that, politically, the jury trial played an essential role in the
development of sovereignty for the people of the
21
United States.

which are continually expanding with the progress of society, adapting themselves to the gradual changes of trade, commerce, arts, inventions and the exigencies and usages of the country."
Keenan v. McGuane, 150 N.E.2d 168, 177 (Ill.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 828 (1958) (citation omitted) (quoting Amann v. Faidy, 114 N.E.2d 412, 418 (Ill. 1953)); see also Torres
v. Walsh, 456 N.E.2d 601, 605 (Ill. 1983).
115. Reliance upon quotations from Blackstone and Sir Matthew Hale as authority
for trial judges evaluating the evidence is questioned by one writer who claimed that
"under the early common law in England, the judge merely summed up the facts and...
the expression of opinions were limited to incidental and suppositional remarks, and not
positive and vigorous expressions of opinions on the facts. So the common law is no true
foundation for the... [reported] practice." Ashley Cockrill, Trial By Jury, 52 AM. L.
REV. 823, 830 (1918).
116. Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Judges and Jurors.- Their Functions, Qualifications, and
Selection, 36 B.U. L. REV. 56 (1956).
117. Scott, supra note 104, at 677.
118. Vanderbilt, supra note 116, at 56.
119. See id. "Juries were popular in America as communal representatives in a day
when the battle cry was 'No taxation without representation.' " Id.
120. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN AND MARGARET A. BERGER, 1 WEINSTEIN'S EvIDENCE
107[01], at 107-11 to -12 (1990).
121. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 291-97 (Phillips Bradley ed. 1945). Alexis de Tocqueville observed:
It would be a very narrow view to look upon the jury as a mere judicial institution; for however great its influence may be upon the decisions of the courts, it
is still greater on the destinies of society at large. The jury is, above all, a political institution, and it must be regarded in this light in order to be duly
appreciated.
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Interestingly, an early draft of the American Constitution failed
to guarantee trial by jury, as now embodied in the Seventh Amendment, which led Alexander Hamilton to remark that friends and
adversaries of the proposed constitution "concur at least in the
value they set upon the trial by jury."' 122 Hamilton ultimately justified the jury's role in decision-making as neutralizing the risk of
corruption in judges. 123 John Adams's diary contains the statement that "the common people . . . should have as complete a

control.., in every judgment of a court ofjudicature" as they have
124
in the other decisions of government.
Natural justice at that time was considered a better source for
125
decision-making than the authority of a black letter maxim.
Since natural law was accessible to the ordinary man, the theory
held, each jury must be allowed to decide for itself whether a par26
ticular rule or law was consonant with principles of higher law. 1
The status of the judiciary in America did not improve but worsened after ties with England were severed. There was an antipathy
among the colonists for royal predilections. 127 Further, most colonial judges still had only minimal legal training and were frequently scorned by members of the bar.128 In 1796, the North
Carolina legislature enacted a law that forbade judges from expressing any opinion to the jury on whether a fact was sufficiently
proved because this was considered the true province of the jury. 129
Other states followed suit. 130 The main argument advanced was
that the judges' comments on the evidence effectively deprived the
13 1
parties of a trial by jury, contrary to the democratic tradition.
This was true, the argument went, even though the judge instructed the jury that it was responsible for resolving all matters of
132
fact and was not bound by the judge's comments.
Moreover, the American colonists broadly supported the proposition that the jury, particularly in criminal cases, should decide
Id. at 293.
122. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 456 (Alexander Hamilton) (Scott ed. 1894).
123. Id. at 458.
124. Comment, supra note 3, at 172 (quoting Diary (Feb. 12, 1771), in 2 THE WORKS
OF JOHN ADAMS 253 (1850)).
125. ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 115-16 (1930).
126. Id. at 130.
127. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 120, 107[01], at 107-12 to -13.
128. Id. at 107-12.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 107-12 to -13.
132. Id. at 107-13; see also Kenneth M. Johnson, The Province of the Judge in Jury
Trials, 12 J. AM. JUD. SOC. 76, 78-80 (1928).
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questions of law as well as questions of fact. 133 This view continued even after the United States Constitution was adopted.
Although there is some dispute as to its intent, even the United
States Supreme Court submitted a case to a jury on an agreed set of
facts in Georgia v. Brailsford.134 In that case, Justice John Jay
charged the jury with the presumption that, although the courts
are the best judges of law, the jury had the "right to take upon...
[itself] to judge of both, and to determine the law as well as the fact
in controversy."' 35 This rule prevailed in a number of state court
36
jurisdictions as well. 1
The concept of the jury sitting as both judge of the law and of
the facts underwent considerable change toward the end of the
19th century as a result of criticism leveled at juries by treatise
writers. 3 7 These writers urged that judges be given more control
over both questions of fact at the trial and announced verdicts because of the judge's expertise in sifting testimony in order to arrive
at the truth.' 38 Noted was the flood of complaints about the caliber
of people who sat on juries, and influential members of the bar
joined in the chorus of jury critics.1 39 One century after Georgia v.
Brailsford "4was decided, the Supreme Court revisited the question and made clear that the jury was required to apply the law, as
4
given to them by the judge, to the facts as the jury shall so find.' 1
Further, by 1898, the United States Supreme Court characterized the term "trial by jury" as referring to a trial by a jury under
the common law and the Seventh Amendment of the United States
Constitution, which meant, "a jury of twelve men, in the presence
and under the superintendence of a judge empowered to instruct
133. Mark D. Howe, Juries as Judges of CriminalLaw, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582, 59091 (1939).
134. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1 (1794) (an Article III, § 2 case, between the State of Georgia
and citizens of South Carolina).
135. Id. at 4.
136. A fascinating history of the American jury's right to decide questions of law and
fact is set forth in Comment, supra note 3, at 170.
137. See Campbell, Some Hints on Defects in the Juiy System, 4 S.U. L. REV. 521
(1878). Campbell noted:
If we persist in applying in the court-room the hustings theory that reading and
writing, with all wisdom, come by nature, and that eery man whom in our
reckless generosity we allow to dispose of our common interests at the ballotbox can be trusted to manage our private interests ir the jury-box, we must take
the consequences.
Id. at 533.
138. Id.
139. See id. at 533-34.
140. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
141. Sparfv. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 100-03 (1895).
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them on the law and to advise them on the facts, and... to set aside
their verdict if in his opinion it is against the law or the
2
4

evidence."1

Nevertheless, by 1928, the constitutions in eight states forbade
judges to comment on the evidence.' 43 In sixteen other states, the
practice was forbidden by statute.' 44 In thirteen additional states,
the procedure was prohibited by court decisions. 4 The English
common law practice remained effective in only ten states. 146 Subsequently, twenty-seven jurisdictions permitted a judge only to sum
up the evidence heard by the jury, but not to evaluate it. 14

In the

overwhelming majority of state courts then, trial judges continued
to be precluded from commenting to juries on the weight to be
4
given the evidence.

In the modem federal system, the judge has retained the power
to comment to the jury on the evidence, to call its attention to
those parts that the judge thinks are important, and to express the
judge's opinions on the facts. This was made clear in Quercia v.
United States,149 in which the United States Supreme Court defined
the federal judge's right to comment. Paradoxically, the limitations of a trial judge in commenting on the evidence, to the detriment of the privilege, was involved in Quercia. There, the judge
told the jury:
You may have noticed ...that the [defendant] wiped his hands

during his testimony. It is a rather curious thing, but that is almost always an indication of lying. Why it should be so we don't
know, but that is the fact. I think that every single word that
142.
course,
143.
144.
145.

146.

Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1899) (emphasis added). Of
even then a judge could not set aside an acquittal of a criminal charge. Id.
Johnson, supra note 132, at 77.
Id.
Id.

Id.

147. ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 226-29 (1949).
148. Id. at 229.
149. 289 U.S. 466 (1933). In Quercia, the Supreme Court stated:
In a trial by jury in a federal court, the judge is not a mere moderator, but is
the governor of the trial for the purpose of assuring its proper conduct and of
determining questions of law. In charging the jury, the trial judge is not limited
to instructions of an abstract sort. It is within his province, whenever he thinks
it necessary, to assist the jury in arriving at a just conclusion by explaining and
commenting upon the evidence, by drawing their attention to the parts of it
which he thinks important; and he may express his opinion upon the facts, provided he makes it clear to the jury that all matters of fact are submitted to their
determination.
Id. at 469 (citation omitted).
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man said, except when he agreed with the Government's testimony, was a lie.' 50
The conviction was reversed on the ground, among others, that the
judge by his comments did not analyze the evidence, but added to
it.' 5 '
The practice of comment in the federal courts is derived largely
from British antecedents in the common law rather than by rule.
Neither rule 30 nor rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
explicitly authorizes judges to sum up or comment on the evidence.' 2 The power has not been widely used in the United States.
In 1966, even in federal and state courts where the English common law practice was permitted, trial judges summarized evidence
to the jury in only eighteen percent of the cases and evaluated the
evidence in only eight percent of the others. 5 3 In the federal
courts alone, the district judges summarized evidence in only
twenty-seven percent of the cases and otherwise commented in
eighteen percent of the cases."'
The power of the judge to sum up and evaluate the evidence in
judicial comments to a jury is not without its detractors.1 55 Among
the several reasons for challenging this judicial power are the following: (1) the judge may be introducing the judge's own biases
that may unduly influence a jury; 56 (2) the judge's view may compete with the views of the parties as adversaries; 5 1 (3) the jury may
give undue importance to the judge's point of view simply because
it is the judge's view;' 58 (4) the judge may not be sufficiently experienced or trained to give objective advice to the jury; 159 (5) the
judge has no better pipeline to the truth than the jury;' 61 (6) biases
possessed by individual jury members, chosen at random, tend to
neutralize each other, whereas the bias of a judge is more difficult
150. Id. at 468.
151. Id. at 471-72.
152. See FED. R. CIv. P. 30, 51.
153. WEINSTEIN, supra note 120, 107[01], at 107-10 n.8 (citing HARRY KALVEN,
JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 422 (1966)). No more recent studies in this
regard appear to have been reported.
154. Id.
155. For an extensive collation of authorities arguing for and against judicial commentary, see id. 107[01], at 107-5 to -6.
156. Stephen A. Saltzberg, The Unnecessarily Expanding Role of the American Trial
Judge, 64 VA. L. REV. 1, 35-36 (1978).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 38-39.
159. See id.
160. Id. at 37-38.
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to counterbalance, neutralize, or control; 16 1 and (7) the timing of
judicial comment is also crucial because, it is claimed, "the impact
of the final bits of evidence ... is pervasive." 162
Another objection is directed to potential misuse of the power:
The power is too dangerous to be placed in the hand even of the
upright and able men who can resist every temptation to do
wrong but are not always immune to the great American fault, a
dogmatic certainty in our opinions, which make us desire to force
them down the throats of others. Until we are ready to discard
the wisdom of our fathers and substitute one man's judgments for
the jury system we must not extend the power of63the trial judges
to impress their views of the facts on the jury. 1
This commentator argues that the judgment of a jury will always
be preferable to that of a judge because most Americans, including
upstanding judges, are overconfident in their individual opinions.
A final objection is not directed at potential misuse of the power,
but questions whether judicial commentary will have any impact at
all upon the jury. A committee of trial lawyers questioned the
value of judicial comment on the weight of the evidence where the
trial judge is nevertheless required to instruct the jury that they are
not bound by the judge's observations.' 1
Statutory restrictions on the power of Illinois judges to comment
on the weight of evidence first appeared with section 37 of the
Practice Act, adopted in 1827.165 The Illinois judges, however,
were still permitted to sum up the evidence presented and its relationship to the issues, until the Act of 1847, which chilled all participation by the judge in the consideration of facts by the jury. 166
As late as 1931, the Illinois Supreme Court extensively reviewed
the authorities on this subject and concluded that it was beyond
the power of an Illinois trial court judge to comment upon the facts
or weight of the evidence because it would be an unlawful arrogation of the jury's prerogatives, directly or indirectly, to the judge. 167
Interestingly, a two judge dissent was filed in that case, which
161. Id. at 36.
Orderof Presentationat Trial, 82 YALE
162. Id. at 38 (quoting Laurens Walker et al.,
L.J. 216, 222 (1972)).
107[01], at 107-14 (quoting Schumaker, Com163. WEINSTEIN, supra note 120,
ment on Evidence by Trial Judges, 32 L. NOTES 5 (1928)).
164. Id. 107[01], at 107-13.
165. ILL. REV. LAWS, Practice § 37 (1827).
166. An Act to Amend the Practice Act, 1847 ILL. LAWS 63, § II. These restrictions
were analyzed by the Chief Justice of the Illinois Supreme Court in 1916. See James H.
Cartwright, Present But Taking No Part, 10 ILL. L. REV. 537 (1916).
167. People v. Kelly, 179 N.E. 898 (IlL. 1931).
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would have found
the statutory forbiddance of judicial comment
168
unconstitutional.

Our present statute, paragraph 2-1107 of the Code of Civil Procedure' 69 reads, in pertinent part: "The court shall give instructions to the jury ...

only as to the law of the case."' 70 Among the

Illinois pattern jury instructions that may be given in this regard
are introductory remarks, conveyed at the judge's discretion before
jury selection and trial commencement, including the following:
You are the judges of the facts in this case, and in that connection you are the judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight to be given to their testimony. It is my duty to inform you
of the applicable law. It is also my duty to determine what evidence you may consider. After the jury has heard all the evidence in this case, and the arguments of counsel, and received the
written instructions from me as to the law, it will be the duty of
the jury to determine the facts in the 71case from the evidence
presented and the Court's instructions. '

Another jury instruction, to be given at the end of the trial, provides in part:
It is your duty to determine the facts, and to determine them
from the evidence produced in open court. You are to apply the
law to the facts and in this way decide the case. Neither sympathy nor prejudice should influence you. Your verdict must be
based on 72
evidence and not upon speculation, guess or
conjecture. 1

Finally, the lengths to which an Illinois trial judge must go in disclaiming to the jury any intent to comment on the evidence is set
forth in the following jury instruction: "Neither by these instructions nor by any ruling or remark which I have1 made
do I or have I
73
meant to indicate any opinion as to the facts."'
Are juries being deprived of essential guidance necessary to
achieve just results in Illinois and in the other states that prohibit
judicial summing up and comment upon the evidence? Apparently
not. The United States Congress has declined to accept a proposed
federal rule of evidence,174 which would have formalized the prac168. Id. at 904 (De Young and Dunn, JJ., dissenting).
169. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1107 (1989).
170. Id. para. 2-1107(a) (emphasis added).
171. ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: Civil, at Intro-8 (3d ed. 1988) (emphasis added) [hereinafter IPI Civ. 3d].
172. IPI Civ. 3d, No. 1.01[3] at 1-50.
173. IPI Civ. 3d, No. 1.01[8] at 1-6 (emphasis added).
174. Proposed rule 105 as drafted by the United States Supreme Court. WEINSTEIN,
supra note 120, 107[01], at 107-1.
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tice now authorized in federal courts and in some state courts,1

75

the ostensive reason being that the proposed rule contains "authority not granted to judges in most [s]tate courts."' 176 Although Congress did not accept the rule, it did not interfere with the practice,
to whatever extent it is now being pursued. As noted earlier, judicial comment is not widely "exercised in either federal or state
77
courts even where it is authorized.

It may be enlightening to consider observations made by judges
who possess the power to comment on evidence to the jury, but
who advocate caution in its use. One such judge, the Honorable
Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., made the following remarks upon this
subject:
There are some who would say that the trial judge has not fulfilled his moral obligation if he merely states clearly the law regarding negligence, causation, contributory fault and types of
recoverable damage. In their opinion it is his duty to analyze the
evidence and demonstrate where the evidence seems strong or
thin and where it appears reliable or untrustworthy. But most
federal judges do not make such analyses. They are not deterred
through laziness, a sentimental regard for the afflatus of the Seventh Amendment or even a fear of reversal. They are mindful
that the community no longer accepts as completely valid legal
principles basing liability upon fault. They perceive a general
recognition of the inevitability of numerous accidents in modern
life, which has made insurance widely available and widely used.
Workmen's compensation acts and other social and economic
legislation have revealed a trend that did not exist when the common law doctrines of tort were formulated. And the judges sense
a new climate of public opinion which rates security as one of the
chief goals of men. 171

Judge Wyzanski also observed that "[tiraditionally juries are the
device by which the rigor of the law is modified pending the enactment of new statutes,"' 79 and quoted from Lord Coke's maxim
that " 'the jurors are chancellors.' "180
Another thoughtful comment was made by a state court judge,
175. Id. 107[01], at 107-1 through 107-4.
176. Id. $ 107[01], at 107-3.
177.
178.

See supra notes 143-54 and accompanying text.
Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., A Trial Judge'sFreedom and Responsibility, 65 HARV.
L. REV. 1281, 1285-86 (1952).
179. Id. at 1286.
180. Id.; cf. Alexander Holtzoff, Remarks at the Judicial Administration Section of
the American Bar Association convened at Atlantic City, New Jersey in The Right of a
Judge to Comment on the Evidence in His Charge to the Jury, 6 F.R.D. 317, 320-26 (1947)
(judicial commentary "guides" the jury and "is an instrument for achieving justice").
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the Honorable Curtis Bok, whose court system permits comment
extending to expression of opinions to the jury with respect to the
evidence.'
Judge Bok stated:
[W]e can [express an opinion] in our state, provided we leave it
entirely to the jury and tell them they are free to form their own
opinion and are not bound by what we say. I say that when I am
in favor of this right to comment, I am also very much in favor of
the judge's sparing use of it. I think the better the judge the more
sparingly it should be used.
To all of us, and particularly in the trial of cases, what we call
the truth is a mysterious and elusive thing. I think most judges
recognize that and the good judge more so. He is the one who
commands the respect of the jury from the beginning and, therefore, every word that he utters has weight with the jurors. As for
the bad judge who takes over the trial and tells the lawyers and
everyone to sit down and who bullies the witness, I don't think it
makes much difference what he says so far as the jury is concerned. We don't have that type of man to any great extent. The
average judge is a conscientious person and he will largely stay
away from expressing opinion, but where he is moved to do so in
the interest of justice but tells the jury that they are free to disregard anything he says it may have a good effect.' 8 2
Clear differences exist among judges with respect to their schooling, social and economic backgrounds, professional experiential
histories, ethnic mores, religious training, and judicial experience. ' 3 There are varying complexities in the cases before them;
the preparation levels and skills of the attorneys involved in the
subject cases; and the nature, quality, and quantity of the evidence
adduced. 8 4 For these reasons, initial and continuing judicial training programs would be in order before such power to influence
juries is released to judges. Training would not only familiarize
judges with appropriate techniques to employ, but would sensitize
judges to their potential biases, give them some conditioning in objectivity, and sharpen their skills in communicating essential infor181. See infra note 182.
182. Curtis Bok, Remarks at the Judicial Administration Section of the American
Bar Association convened at Atlantic City, New Jersey in The Right of a Judge to Comment on the Evidence in His Charge to the Jury, 6 F.R.D. 317, 319 (1947). Comments by
the trial judge may be so prejudicial, however, that they can "not be cured by ritualistic
statements telling the jury that the issues were solely for the jury to decide." United
States v. Assi, 748 F.2d 62, 68 (2d Cir. 1984).
183. See Allen Hartman, "Judges May Differ": Another Look at Judicial DecisionMaking, 76 ILL. B.J. 540, 541 (1988).
184. See Charles P. Curtis, The TrialJudge and the Jury, 5 .VAND. L. REV. 150, 163
(1952).
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mation to juries. Should the power to sum up and evaluate the
evidence in the judge's commentary to the jury become more widespread, it is suggested that the foregoing steps first be taken to minimize potential abuses.
In the absence of compulsory judicial schooling in most jurisdictions today, the outlook for the establishment of such educational
programs is not very bright. For practical reasons, perhaps the
best course would be a continuation of the status quo with respect
to judicial commentary to juries. Although our English common
law heritage suggests that we allow broad judicial commentary on
the evidence, our own democratic principles serve to remind us
that jury independence may require limited judicial commentary.
Presently, the status quo seems to preserve this as well.

